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Abstract
This paper considers the secrecy communication of a wirelessly powered network, where an energy
constrained legitimate transmitter (Alice) sends message to a legitimate receiver (Bob) with the energy
harvested from a dedicated power beacon (PB), while an eavesdropper (Eve) intends to intercept the
information. A simple time-switching protocol with a time-switching ratio α is used to supply power for
the energy constrained legitimate transmitter. To improve the physical layer security, we firstly propose a
protocol that combines maximum ratio transmission (MRT) with zero-forcing (ZF) jamming for the case
where Eve is passive in the network, so that Alice only has access to the channel state information (CSI)
of Bob. Then we propose a protocol that uses a ZF transmitting strategy to minimize the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) at Eve for the case where Eve is active in the network, so that Alice only has access to
the partial CSI of Eve. Closed-form expressions and simple approximations of the connection outage
probability and secrecy outage probability are derived for both protocols. Furthermore, the secrecy
throughput as well as the diversity orders achieved by our proposed protocols are characterized and the
optimal time-switching ratio α and power allocation coefficient β for secrecy throughput maximization
are derived in the high SNR regime. Finally, numerical results validate the effectiveness of the proposed
schemes.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
With the current growing demand for energy in modern wireless networks, energy harvesting
techniques that scavenge energy from ambient environment such as wind and solar, have attracted
a lot of attention as important ways of prolonging the lifetime of energy-constrained wireless
networks [1]. However, harvesting energy from solar, wind or other natural energy depends
heavily on location and weather conditions, and so fails to generate stable energy output. It
follows that such techniques may not be suitable for powering wireless devices with strict
quality of service requirements [2]. An alternative solution, generally referred to as wireless
energy transfer (WET), which exploits the radio frequency (RF) signals as a means for energy
transportation, has been proposed. RF signals are widely used, which means that WET can
provide stable energy supplies for mobile devices. The area of wireless powered communication
(WPC) design and optimization is always a hot topic in the field of WET [3], because it considers
the transfer and usage of energy synthetically. Multi-antenna techniques are one method adopted
to improve the performance of WET over fading channels, and works by exploiting spatial
degrees of freedom [4]. The application of advanced smart antenna technologies to WPC,
including multiple-input multiple-output and relaying techniques, are also investigated for their
use in significantly improving the energy efficiency and also the spectral efficiency of WET [5]. In
[6], an energy-constrained relay is considered for use in enhancing the information transmission
rate of an energy-constrained source in a wireless-powered cooperative communication network.
In [7], the tradeoff between wireless energy and information transfer when adjusting the transfer
duration with a total duration constraint is considered. As a result, two wireless energy and
information transfer tradeoff schemes, which work by maximizing an upper bound and an
approximate lower bound of the average information transmission rate, are proposed. In [8],
an optimal time allocation scheme is proposed for a wireless communication network with a
full-duplex hybrid energy and information access point and a set of wireless users with energy
harvesting capabilities.
Nevertheless, due to the open nature of wireless medium, RF signals are shared by multiple
nodes, which constitute potential eavesdroppers. Hence, information leakage is also a critical
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3problem to be addressed in a wireless powered communication network (WPCN). As shown in
[3], which considers the effects of having limited power supply in WPCNs, modifying physical
layer security is a better method of realizing wireless security when compared to conventional
cryptographic approaches. The basic idea of physical layer security technology is to exploit the
physical characteristics of wireless channels in order to provide secure transmission without
relying on traditional encryption mechanisms [9]. It has been shown that a positive secrecy rate
can be achieved for the scenario where the source, destination and eavesdropper are equipped
with a single antenna, and the source-eavesdropper channel is a degraded version of the main
source-destination channel [9], [10]. When the source-destination channel condition is inferior
to the source-eavesdropper channel condition, using multiple antennas can help to improve the
secrecy rates. In [11]–[14], the secrecy capacity of the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
wiretap channel, where each node is equipped with multiple antennas, has been investigated in
the presence of one or more eavesdroppers. Also, an artificial jamming scheme introduced in [15],
which injects artificial-noise (AN) into the wireless communication system, has been recognized
as an active approach for improving the physical layer security. In [16], [17], artificial-noise is
applied to the multiple-input single-output (MISO) networks to enhance secrecy transmission,
and in [18], it is considered for use in the downlink secure transmission of a multi-cell massive
MIMO system with matched-filter precoding.
Recently, the application of physical layer security technology to WPCNs has gained lots of
attention. In [19], the optimal beamforming design and power allocation scheme for MISO
systems in the presence of one or more eavesdroppers are presented, while in [20], the
beamforming design for maximizing the achievable secrecy rate in MIMO networks that are
subject to a total power constraint and an energy harvesting constraint is studied. In [21], the
authors consider resource allocation for cognitive networks, and in [22], the power allocation for
secure OFDMA systems with wireless information and power transfer is investigated. The above
works consider a hybrid network architecture, where the information source acts simultaneously
as the source of energy. However, just as shown in [23], [24], it is generally infeasible to power
larger devices with the energy harvested from hybrid networks. Therefore, a novel network
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4architecture is proposed, where a dedicated station called power beacon (PB) is incorporated
into a WPCN to supply power for the energy-constrained device.
The performance of a secure WPCN with a dedicated power beacon (PB) is analyzed in
[2] and its robust resource allocation is presented in [25]. However, in the area of secure
communications in WPCNs with dedicated PBs, artificial jamming has not been considered for
use in improving the secrecy performance of the whole system. Motivated by this, we consider
the secrecy communication of a wirelessly powered network consisting of one power beacon
(PB), one legitimate transmitter (Alice) and one legitimate receiver (Bob) in the presence of a
single eavesdropper (Eve). Artificial jamming is designed for the network. To be more specific,
we firstly propose a protocol that combines maximum ratio transmission (MRT) with zero-
forcing (ZF) jamming for the case where Eve is passive in the network,so that Alice only has
access to the channel state information (CSI) of Bob. Then we propose a protocol that uses a
ZF transmitting strategy to minimize the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at Eve for the case where
Eve is active in the network, so that Alice has access to the partial CSI of Eve. Closed-form
expressions and simple approximations of the connection outage probability and secrecy outage
probability are derived for both protocols. Furthermore, the secrecy throughput as well as the
diversity orders achieved by our proposed protocols are characterized. Finally, the optimal time-
switching ratio α and power allocation coefficient β for secrecy throughput maximization are
derived in the high SNR regime.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model and
presents the transmission protocols, while Section III-A provides an analytical study comparing
their connection outage probability, secrecy outage probability, diversity order and secrecy
throughput. In Section III-B, the optimal resource allocation (i.e. the values of α and β which
maximize secrecy throughput) is discussed for the high SNR regime. Section IV presents the
numerical results to validate our theoretic results and the secrecy performance of the proposed
protocols. Finally, Section V concludes the paper and gives a brief summary of the key findings.
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5II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the secrecy communication of a wirelessly powered network consisting of one
power beacon (PB), one legitimate transmitter (Alice) and one legitimate receiver (Bob) in
the presence of one eavesdropper (Eve). The legitimate transmitter Alice is equipped with
N antennas, while all the other nodes in the considered system are equipped with a single
antenna. It is also assumed that the channels experience Rayleigh fading, remain constant over
the transmission block time T , and vary independently and identically from one block to the
other.
Alice is not self-powered and needs to harvest energy from the signals sent by the PB. In this
paper, we adopt the time-sharing protocol proposed in [26], wherein the entire transmission slot
with time duration T is divided into two orthogonal phases. The first phase is for power transfer
and has time duration αT (where α ∈ (0, 1) is the time switching ratio) and the second is for
information transmission and has time duration (1− α)T . During the first phase, the PB sends






where P is the transmit power of the PB, d1 is the distance between the PB and Alice, τ is
the path loss exponent, xe is the energy signal with unit power and ns is an N -dimensional
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector with E {nsnHs } = N0I. The N × 1 vector hPS
denotes the channel between the PB and Alice and its elements are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian variables with zero mean and unit variance. At the end of





where η (0 < η < 1) denotes the energy conversion efficiency. As in [26], we assume that the
energy harvested during the first phase is stored in a supercapacitor and then fully consumed by
Alice to send signals in the second phase. So during the second phase, the transmit power of
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6where y1 = ‖hPS‖2 and K = ηα1−α .
Now, let us consider the information transmission phase. With the aim of guaranteeing security,
we propose two protocols. The first is for the case where Eve is passive in the network, while
the second is for the case where Eve is active.
A. Eve is Passive
When Eve is passive in the network, Alice only has access to the CSI of Bob. To utilize the
CSI of the main channel, we combine maximum ratio transmission (MRT) with zero-forcing
(ZF) jamming. To be more specific, let the 1 × N vector hSD denote the channel from Alice
to Bob whose elements are i.i.d. complex Gaussian variables with zero mean and unit variance,
and order the elements of hSD as h1 ≥ h2 ≥ · · ·hN . Then Alice selects the K (K ≥ 2) best
antennas corresponding to the channels h1, h2, · · ·hK to perform both MRT and ZF jamming at
the same time. Let us define ĥSD = [h1h2 · · ·hK ] as the 1×K vector corresponding to the K







where β denotes the proportion of Alice’s power allocated to maximum ratio information
transmission, xs is the information signal with unit power, wJ is the K × 1 ZF beamforming
vector which satisfies ‖wJ‖ = 1 and ĥSDwJ = 0 and xJ is the jamming signal with unit power.






where d2 is the distance between Alice and Bob and nD denotes the AWGN with zero mean













where d3 is the distance between Alice and Eve, the 1×K vector hSE denotes the channel from
Alice’s transmitting antennas to Eve whose elements are i.i.d. complex Gaussian variables with
zero mean and unit variance, nE denotes the AWGN with zero mean and variance N0.
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7Let us define y2 =
∥∥∥ĥSD∥∥∥2, y3 = ∣∣∣∣hSE ĥHSD‖ĥSD‖
∣∣∣∣2, and y4 = |hSEwJ |2. Then, the instantaneous










(1− β)KPy1y4 + d τ1 d τ3N0
, (2)
respectively.
B. Eve is Active
When Eve is active in the network, Alice has access to the partial CSI of Eve. To utilize the
CSI of the wiretap channel, we use a ZF transmitting strategy to minimize the SNR at Eve.
Initially, Alice selects K (K ≥ 2) antennas randomly, to participate in transmission. Let the
1×K vectors gSE and gSD denote the channels from Alice’s transmitting antennas to Eve and
Bob respectively, where the elements of the channels are i.i.d. complex Gaussian variables with
zero mean and unit variance. In this paper, we assume that Alice only has partial eavesdropper
CSI, which can be modeled as
gSE = ĝSE + ∆E,
where ĝSE is Alice’s estimation of the wiretap channel and ∆E is the estimation error, which
is an K-dimensional AWGN vector with E {∆E∆HE} = NEI.






where ws is the K × 1 beamforming vector satisfying ‖ws‖ = 1 and ĝSEws = 0, and we is the
K × 1 beamforming vector satisfying ‖we‖ = 1 and gSDwe = 0. Then the received signals at


















Let us define z2 = |gSDws|2, z3 = |gSEwe|2 and z4 = |∆Ews|2. Then, the instantaneous SNR














In this paper, we study the secrecy performance of our proposed protocols by considering the
outage based secrecy metrics. Let us denote the confidential message rate as Rs and the rate of
the transmitted codeword as Rt. When the capacity of the main channel from Alice to Bob is
below Rt, Bob can not decode the received message correctly. Thus we define the probability of
this event as connection outage probability. On the other hand, when the capacity of the wiretap
channel from Alice to Eve is above the rate Re , Rt−Rs, we cannot guarantee perfect security,
so Eve may be able to intercept the message. The probability of such an event occuring is defined
as secrecy outage probability. With a given connection outage probability σ and secrecy outage
probability  the secrecy throughput can be defined as
C , (1− σ)Rs,
which is suitable for evaluating the secrecy performance of systems with stringent delay
constraints [27].
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9III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we start by giving the exact closed-form expressions of the connection outage
probability and the secrecy outage probability of our proposed protocols. We then investigate the
secrecy throughput of the system. At last, we give the diversity orders of our proposed protocols
in the high SNR regime and derive the optimal time switching ratio α and power allocating
coefficient β for a given connection outage probability σ and secrecy outage probability .
A. Secrecy Throughput Analysis
1) When Eve is Passive: As shown in Section II-C and Section II-A, when Eve is passive,
the connection outage probability can be defined as
PMRTco = Pr ((1− α) log2(1 + γD) < Rt) . (5)




and γ′ = 2
( Rt1−α)−1
G
. Then the connection outage probability is given
by:
































−∑K−2m=0 (−lK )mm! ∑N−1k=0 2γ′(m+k+1)/2k! K(m−k+1)(2√γ′))] ,
where Kn(x) is the n-th order, second kind, modified Bessel function [28].
Proof. See Appendix.
Similarly, when Eve is passive, the secrecy outage probability can be defined as
PMRTso = Pr ((1− α) log2(1 + γE) > Re) . (7)
Let us define γe = 2(
Re





KPβ and e2 =
(1−β)γe
β
. Then the secrecy outage
probability is given by:
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Proof. See Appendix.
Now let us consider the maximal secrecy throughput CMRT = (1 − σ)(Rt − Re) under the
outage constraints PMRTco ≤ σ and PMRTso ≤ . Since PMRTco is a monotonic increasing function of
Rt, and PMRTso is a monotonic decreasing function of Re, the outage constraints can be degraded
to PMRTco = σ and P
MRT
so = . Unfortunately, the expressions in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 are
too complex to get a closed-form analysis result for CMRT . However, by employing the bisection
search, numeral results for the maximal Rt and minimal Re can be obtained, and the maximal
secrecy throughput can be calculated as CMRT = (1− σ)(Rt −Re).
In the following, we study the secrecy performance in the high SNR regime. When P/N0 →
∞, PMRTco and PMRTso can be approximated using the following corollary.
Corollary 3. When P/N0 →∞,









































Recall the expression of diversity order that is defined as [29]:





where Pe is the maximum likelihood (ML) probability of detection error. The outage probability
will be studied by following similar steps to [29], since the ML error probability can be tightly
bounded by the outage probability at high SNR. Based on Corollary 4 we can then find the
diversity order of the system when Eve is passive.
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Corollary 4. The diversity order of the system when Eve is passive can be expressed as
dMRT = N. (11)
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that our proposed protocol achieves a full diversity gain when Eve is passive.
2) When Eve is Active: Similarly, when Eve is active, the connection outage probability can
be defined as
PZFco = Pr ((1− α) log2(1 + γ̂D) < Rt) .
The connection outage probability is then given by:














Furthermore, when Eve is active, the secrecy outage probability can be defined as
PZFso = Pr ((1− α) log2(1 + γ̂E) > Re) . (13)
Then the secrecy outage probability is given by:





















In the high SNR regime, when P/N0 → ∞, PZFco and PZFso can be approximated using the
following corollary.
Corollary 7. When P/N0 →∞
PZFco ≈
γ′
N − 1 ,








By applying Corollary 8 we can then find the diversity order of the system when Eve is active.
Corollary 8. The diversity order of the system when Eve is active can be expressed as
dZF = 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
B. Optimizing α and β for Secrecy Throughput Maximization in high SNR regimes
1) When Eve is Passive: Now let us consider the maximal secrecy throughput CMRT =
(1 − σ)(Rt − Re) when Eve is passive. We define Mσ′N lnσ′ = σ, then from Corollary 3 and
the outage constraints PMRTco = σ and P
MRT
so = , we have that CMRT can be approximated as
CMRT ≈ (1− σ)(RMRTt −RMRTe ),
in the high SNR regime, where

















Therefore, the optimal time and power allocating coefficients (α∗, β∗) can be approximated as



















s.t. 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1.
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Theorem 9. In the high SNR regime, under the outage constraints PMRTco ≤ σ and PMRTso ≤ ,











1 +W(eV ln 2)
, (15)


















2) When Eve is Active: Similarly, let us consider the maximal secrecy throughput CZF = (1−
σ)(Rt−Re) when Eve is active. Firstly, we define σ̂ = (N −1)σ and ̂ = / (NE + (1−NE)).
Then, given Corollary 7 and the outage constraints PZFco = σ and P
ZF
so = , CZF can be
approximated in the high SNR regime as
CZF ≈ (1− σ)(RZFt −RZFe ),
where

















Then, by Theorem 9, it follows that the optimal time and power allocating coefficients (α′, β′)











1 +W(eV ′ ln 2)
, (16)
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Numerical Result, Eve is Passive
Approximate Result,  Eve is Passive
Numerical Result, Eve is Active
Approximate Result,  Eve is Active
Analytical Result, Eve is Passive
Analytical Result, Eve is Active
Fig. 1. Connection Outage Probability
where W(x) = f−1(xex) is the the Lambert W function and

















In this section, we present the numerical results to validate our analytical conclusions. Unless
otherwise stated, we set the path loss exponent as τ = 2.5, the distance between the power
beacon and Alice as d1 = 10m, the distance between Alice and Eve as d3 = 10m, the noise
power as N0 = −80dBm and the energy conversion efficiency as η = 0.3. In the following, some
representative simulation results are given to provide deeper insight into the proposed secrecy
transmission protocols.
In Fig. 1, we show the connection outage probability for the two protocols. In this figure, we
assume that d2 = 10m (the distance between Alice and Bob), N = 3, K = 2, α = 0.8, β = 0.3
and Rt = 3 Bits/s/Hz. From this figure, we can see that the analytical result coincides with
numerical simulation perfectly and the approximation deviates a little more when compared
with them in the high SNR regime. The approximation and numerical simulation curves get
closer when the transmitting power P increases, and the connection outage probability of the































Numerical Result, Eve is Passive
Numerical Result, Eve is Active
Analytical Result, Eve is Active
Approximate Result, Eve is Active
Analytical Result, Eve is Passive
Approximate Result, Eve is Passive
Fig. 2. Secrecy Outage Probability
protocol we proposed for when Eve is passive outperforms that of the protocol proposed for
when Eve is active. From Section III, we know that the protocol proposed for when Eve is
passive achieves full diversity order while that proposed for when Eve is active only achieves a
unit diversity order, and that is also confirmed by this figure.
In Fig. 2, we show how the secrecy outage probabilities vary when we use different power
allocation coefficients β for each of the two protocols. In this figure, we assume that N = 3,
K = 2, α = 0.5, Re = 1 Bits/s/Hz, P = 10dBm and NE = 0.1. From this figure, we can see
that the analytical result and approximate result coincide with the numerical simulation perfectly.
Moreover, the secrecy outage probability of the protocol that we propose when Eve is active
outperforms that of the protocol proposed when Eve is passive. When β decreases, the proportion
of Alice’s power allocated to jamming increases and the secrecy outage probability decreases
quickly. This validates the effectiveness of the ZF jamming used in this paper.
In Fig. 3, to evaluate the suboptimal choice of (α, β) proposed in Theorem 9, the suboptimal
secrecy throughput with Theorem 9 is compared with the optimal secrecy throughput. We assume
that d2 = 10m, σ = 0.0001,  = 0.01 and K = 2 and that the optimal secrecy throughput
(α, β) ∈ [0 : 0.01 : 1] × [0 : 0.01 : 1] can be found via exhaustive search. From this figure, we
can see that the suboptimal result found using Theorem 9 approaches the optimal result perfectly
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suboptimal result with Theorem 5, N=4
suboptimal result with Theorem 5, N=3
result with fixed β=0.3, α=0.6, N=4
result with fixed β=0.3, α=0.6, N=3
optimal result with exhaustive search, N=4
optimal result with exhaustive search, N=3
Fig. 3. Optimal secrecy throughput










































Eve is Passive, N=4
Eve is Active, N=4, N
E
=0.1
Eve is Passive, N=3
Eve is Active, N=3, N
E
=0.1
Eve is Active, N=3, N
E
=0.01
Fig. 4. Secrecy throughput of the two protocols
and outperforms the result with fixed (α, β), which validates the theorem’s effectiveness.
In Fig. 4, we compare the secrecy throughput of the two protocols. In this figure, we assume
that d2 = 10m, σ = 0.01,  = 0.01 and K = 2, and that the allocation coefficients (α, β) of
the two protocols are found using the suboptimal schemes in (15) and (16), respectively. From
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Eve is Passive, N=4
Eve is Passive, N=5
Eve is Active, N=4, N
E
=0.1
Eve is Active, N=4, N
E
=0.01
Fig. 5. Secrecy throughput of the two protocols vs distance
this figure, we can see that the secrecy throughput of the protocol that we propose when Eve is
passive outperforms that of the protocol proposed when Eve is active. Increasing N improves
the secrecy throughput of both protocols, and the secrecy throughput decreases with NE when
Eve is active.
Fig. 5 shows the secrecy throughput of the two protocols versus d2 (the distance between
Alice and Bob) when P = 30dBm, σ = 0.01,  = 0.01 and K = 4. From this figure, we
can see that the protocol that we propose when Eve is passive always outperforms the protocol
proposed when Eve is active. Furthermore, both protocols can be seen to achieve a positive
secrecy throughput even when d2 (the distance between Alice and Bob) is larger than d3 (the
distance between Alice and Eve), demonstrating their efficacy. Finally, increasing N can combat
the loss of secrecy throughput caused by increasing the distance, d2. However, the effect of NE
is small when d2 is large.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper on the enhancement of physical layer security we began by proposing a protocol
that combines maximum ratio transmission (MRT) with zero-forcing (ZF) jamming for the case
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where an eavesdropper, Eve, is passive in the network. We then proposed a protocol that uses a
ZF transmitting strategy to minimize the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at Eve for the case where
Eve is active in the network. For both protocols, closed-form expressions as well as simple
approximations of the connection outage probability and secrecy outage probability are presented,
from which the secrecy throughput as well as the diversity orders achieved by our proposed
protocols are derived. Finally, the optimal time-switching ratio α and power allocation coefficient
β for secrecy throughput maximization are derived in the high SNR regime. Numerical results
show that with these values for α and β, the secrecy throughput approaches the optimal result
perfectly and outperforms the schemes in which α and β are fixed. The two protocols both
achieve positive secrecy throughput even when d2 (the distance between Alice and Bob) is
larger than d3 (the distance between Alice and Eve) and this validates the effectiveness of the
two protocols.
APPENDIX























2N0/(βKP ), and the probability density function (pdf) of y1
follows a chi-squared distribution with 2N degrees of freedom given by [30]:
fy1(x) =
xN−1e−x
(N − 1)! . (17)









With the help of Eq. (3.351.1) [28], we obtain














August 10, 2018 DRAFT
19













. Furthermore, as in [31], we know that the pdf of y2
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−∑K−2m=0 (−lK )mm! ∑N−1k=0 2γ′(m+k+1)/2k! K(m−k+1)(2√γ′))] ,
and the theorem is proved. 






































where γe = 2(
Re
1−α) − 1. Furthermore, recall that y3 =
∣∣∣∣hSE ĥHSD‖ĥSD‖
∣∣∣∣2 and y4 = |hSEwJ |2. Since
ĥHSD
‖ĥSD‖
and wJ are orthonormal vectors, it follows that y3 and y4 follow an exponential distribution
with unit power and are independent of each other. The pdf of y1 has been shown in (17), and
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KPβ and e2 =
(1−β)γe
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and the theorem is proved. 
Proof of Corollary 3 : In the high SNR regime, when P/N0 →∞, we know that γ′ → 0 and
e1 → 0. Utilizing Theorems 1 and 2, the expressions of the connection outage probability PMRTco















































After expanding the Bessel function by Eq. (8.446) [28] and omitting the high order items of
γ′ and e1, we obtain









































This proves the corollary. 
Proof of Corollary 4 : We begin by defining the outage probability as
PMRTout , Pr ((1− α) (log2 (1 + γD)− log2 (1 + γE)) < Rs) .
In the high SNR regime, we have ρ = P/N0 → ∞ as γD → ∞, and so
log2 (1 + γD) − log2 (1 + γE) → log2 (1 + γD). Therefore, in the high SNR regime,









= N , which proves the corollary. 
Proof of Theorem 9 : From section III-A1, we know that in the high SNR regime, under the
outage constraints PMRTco ≤ σ and PMRTso ≤ , the optimal time and power allocating coefficients




















s.t. 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1.




s.t. 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1,















. In the following, we show
that RMRTs is a concave function of (α, β) in the high SNR regime.



















































− (1− α)(1− )
ln 2[2(1− β)2 + (1− β)(β − )] ,

















and it is easy to see that ∂
2RMRTs
∂2α




















(1− α)(1− )[1− 2β + (4β − 3)]
ln 2[2(1− β)2 + (1− β)(β − )]2 .

















(1− α)(1− )(1− 2β + 4β− 3)










(1− )(1− 2β + 4β− 3)
(1− β)2(β + − 2β)2 .





C = (1− )(1− 2β + 4β− 3) (20)
= (3− 4β)2 + (6β − 4)− 2β + 1
and
D = (β + − 2β)2
= 2 + β2 + 2β− 4β2 − 4β2+ 42β2.
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Equation 20 implies that C = (1 − )[(1 − 2β) + (4β − 3)]. We now consider three cases
depending on the value of β. First, let 1
2
< β < 3
4
. Then we have 1− 2β < 0 and (4β− 3) < 0,
so that C < 0 and A−B > 0. Next consider the case where β > 3
4
. Then (2β−1)/−(4β−3) >
(2β − 1)− (4β − 3) = 2− 2β > 0 and C = −(1− )[(2β − 1)/− (4β − 3)] < 0, from which
it also follows that A−B > 0.
Finally, we consider the case where β < 1
2
and we cannot tell whether C < 0 or C > 0.
When C < 0, B < 0 and it is straightforward to see that A−B > 0. On the other hand, when
C > 0, we have (1− 2β) + (4β − 3) > 0, and thus  < 2β−1
4β−3 . It follows that
∂C
∂




= 2(1− 2β)(β + − 2β) > 0.
This means that the maximum value of C and minimum value of D, and thus the maximum
value for B, occur when  = 0. Now we only need to prove that when β < 1
2
and  = 0,









proving that A−B is always greater than zero and that, therefore, ∂2RMRTs
∂2β
≤ 0 in the high SNR
regime.
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(1− α)(1− )[1− 2β + (4β − 3)]






− (1− )(1− 2β + 4β− 3)




















− (1− )(1− 2β + 4β− 3)
















− (1− )(1− 2β + 4β− 3)















(1− β)(+ β − 2β)
(−(1− 2β + 4β− 3)
(1− β)(+ β − 2β) −
(1− )










(1− β)2(+ β − 2β)2O,
where
O = −(1− 2β + 4β− 3)− (1− ) + 2
β















> 0 always holds in the high SNR
regime.
August 10, 2018 DRAFT
25
Therefore we have proved that the optimization problem in (18) is a concave problem, and








= 0 in the high SNR












1 +W(eV ln 2)
,

















This completes the proof. 























2N0/(βKP ), and the pdf of z2 is an exponential distribution with













which completes the proof of the theorem. 












where γe = 2(
Re
1−α)− 1 and the pdf of z3 is an exponential distribution with unit power. The pdf
of z4 is an exponential distribution with power NE . Using the same method as in the proof of
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and the theorem is proved. 
Proof of Corollary 7 : In the high SNR regime, when P/N0 →∞, we know that γ′ → 0 and
e1 → 0. By Theorems 5 and 6, the expressions of the connection outage probability PZFco and

































After expanding the Bessel function by Eq. (8.446) [28] and omitting the high order items of
γ′ and e1, we can obtain
PZFco ≈
γ′






which proves the corollary. 
Proof of Corollary 8 : We define the outage probability as
PZFout , Pr ((1− α) (log2 (1 + γ̂D)− log2 (1 + γ̂E)) < Rs) . (25)
Then, with the help of corollary 7 and following the same steps as in the proof of Corollary 4,




= 1, and the corollary is proved. 
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